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Market Concentration and Performance:
A Survey of the Evidence
Almarin Phillips*
The venerable Alcoa case1 defines the problems I address in
this paper. Judge Learned Hand, emphasizing that monopoly af-
fords a firm "control" of the market and freedom "to raise its
prices," 2 concluded that a market share of ninety percent "is
enough to constitute a monopoly."3 As market share drops, how-
ever, so-according to Judge Hand-does monopoly power. Thus,
Judge Hand's opinion indicated that "it is doubtful whether sixty or
sixty-four percent would be enough; and certainly thirty-three per-
cent is not."4 There are, of course, numerous decisions to the same
effect, including many merger cases.5 The conventional wisdom
contained therein argues that market power is greater when the
market share of the leading firm is large, the combined share of the
largest firms is high, and the overall number of firms in the market
is small.6
Given some data and a computer, economists are wont to "test
hypotheses." And there are data on market concentration and vari-
ous measures of market performance that have prompted econo-
mists to test hypotheses such as those suggested by the Alcoa case
and, of course, those suggested by economic theorizing itself.
These "structure-conduct-performance" empirical studies are sum-
marized and criticized in Part I.
At the same time that he promulgated his structural test for
monopoly-noting in passing that the law forbad all trusts, "good"
and "bad" alike-Judge Hand appears to have acknowledged that
* Hower Professor of Public Policy and Professor of Law and Economics, University of
Pennsylvania; B.A., 1948, M.A., 1949, University of Pennsylvania; Ph.D., 1953, Harvard
University.
1 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
2 Id. at 425, 426.
3 Id. at 424.
4 Id.
5 See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
6 See F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (2d
ed. 1980), for a complete exposition. More theoretical treatments are given in Clarke &
Davies, Market Structure and Price-Cost Margins, 49 ECONOMICA 277 (1982); Cowling, On the
Theoretical Specification of Industrial Structure-Performance Relationships, 8 EUR. ECON. REV. 1
(1976); Cowling & Waterson, Price-Cost Margins and Market Structure, 43 ECONOMICA 275
(1976); Geroski, Interpreting a Correlation Between Market Structure and Performance, 30J. INDUS.
ECON. 319 (1982); and Saving, Concentration Ratios and the Degree of Monopoly, 11 INT'L ECON.
REV. 139 (1970).
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the phenomena of apparent monopoly may have causal directions
and social consequences which differ from those that ruled his Alcoa
decision. "Monopoly," he opined, "may [be] thrust upon" a firm;
firms "may unwittingly find themselves in a position of monopoly
and . . . they may become monopolists by force of accident."
7
There are, then, other aspects to the structure-conduct-perform-
ance relationship. One of these is the possibility that concentration
as we find it developing and existing in the marketplace is the result
of a stochastic (random) process, both inevitable and benign. This
idea is treated in Part II.
Of far greater intellectual and policy consequence is the possi-
bility that concentration is typically the result of what Judge Hand
called "superior skill, foresight and industry." 8 Some have argued
that the structure-conduct-performance paradigm is diametrically
wrong; the correct relationship is from conduct and performance,
on the one hand, to market structure, on the other.9 Firms that
perform well, efficiently producing products and services which
consumers prefer, gain market share and earn relatively high prof-
its. Similarly, firms that successfully innovate grow more rapidly
and earn higher profits than do their less successful rivals. As the
Alcoa decision somewhat incongruously observes, it would be
counterproductive if the "successful competitor, having been urged
to compete," were "turned upon when he wins."' 1 These are the
matters treated in Part III.
Part IV attempts to bring the assorted empirical evidence into
perspective. That there can be excessive monopoly power and abu-
sive monopolization is not denied. Certainly there can be section
two offenses. At the same time, it is doubtful that any search for a
Rosetta Stone of industrial organization can ever be successful.
There simply is no way to translate unequivocally from market con-
centration to unreasonable market power. The attempts to do so
may in fact hide-rather than reveal-the secrets of markets.
I. Empirical Tests of the Structure-Conduct-Performance
Paradigm
The structure-conduct-performance (S-C-P) paradigm is sim-
ple enough. The idea is that in unregulated markets, characteristics
of market structure (e.g., the number of sellers, market concentra-
tion, entry conditions) largely determine sellers' conduct (e.g., the
degree and type of rivalry or collusiveness among firms), and that
7 148 F.2d at 429-30.
8 Id. at 430.
9 See note 33 infra.
10 148 F.2d at 430.
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together these factors (along with other exogenous variables-in-
comes, tastes, developments in other markets) largely determine
market performance (price-cost relationships, in particular),."
There have been literally hundreds of empirical explorations of
various S-C-P hypotheses. 12 While there are many differences
among them, the usual approach uses ordinary least squares (OLS)
regressions to discover relationships between a dependent variable
purporting to measure market performance and a set of independ-
ent variables designed to reflect characteristics of the market (and,
sometimes, of particular firms). 13 The dependent performance va-
riable in these studies may be price, the relative markup of price
over (marginal) cost, or some rate of return on investment for a
cross section of firms in a large sample of markets or industries.
Some of the studies compare industries with different structures at
a given time while others include intertemporal observations as
well.
The independent variables typically include concentration
measures (e.g., four-firm or eight-firm concentration, Herfindahl in-
dexes), variables to represent barriers to entry (e.g., advertising-
sales ratios, minimum efficient scale of production), and one or
more variables to capture differences or changes in demand. Other
11 See sources cited in note 6 supra.
12 The modem versions began with Bain, Relation of Profit Rate to Industrial Concentration:
American Manufacturing, 1936-40, 65 Q. JOUR. ECON. 293 (1951). A review of other early
studies appears in Weiss, Quantitative Studies in Industrial Organization, in FRONTIERS IN QUAN-
TrrATIvE ECONOMICS (M. Intriligator ed. 1971) and in Weiss, The Concentration-Profits Rela-
tionship and Antitrust, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEw LEARNING (H. Goldschmid,
H. Mann & J. Weston eds. 1974) [hereinafter cited as INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION].
Scherer reviews other principal studies through the late 1970s. See F. SCHERER, supra note
6. The more recent studies-each of which provides a more extensive bibliography-in-
clude: Bothwell, Cooley & Hall, A New View of the Market Structure-Perfomance Debate, 32 J.
INDUS. ECON. 397 (1984); Dalton & Penn, The Concentration Profitability Relationship: Is There a
Critical Ratio?, 25 J. INDUS. ECON. 133 (1976); Gale & Branch, Concentration versus Market
Share: Which Determines Performance and Why Does It Matter?, 27 ANTITRUST BULL. 83 (1982);
Geithman, Marvel & Weiss, Concentration, Price and Critical Concentration Ratios, 63 REV. EcoN.
& STAT. 346 (1981); Hart & Morgan, Market Structure and Economic Performance in the United
Kingdom, 25 J. INDUS. ECON. 177 (1977); Kwoka, The Effect of Market Share Distribution on
Industry Performance, 61 REV. ECON. & STAT. 101 (1979); Newman, Strategic Groups and the
Structure-Performance Relationship, 60 REV. ECON. & STAT. 417 (1978); Ravenscraft, Structure-
Profit Relationships at the Line of Business and Industry Level, 65 REV. ECON. & STAT. 22 (1983);
Schmalensee, Do Markets Differ Much?, 75 AMER. ECON. REV. 341 (1985); White, Searching for
the Critical Industrial Concentration Ratio: An Application of the "Switching Regimes" Technique, in
STUDIES IN NON-LINEAR ESTIMATION (S. Goldfeld & R. Quandt eds. 1976). The latter is not
an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression study, but it does include an analysis of vari-
ance. See note 13 infra and accompanying text.
13 For an excellent discussion of the OLS regression method, see Fisher, Multiple Re-
gression in Legal Proceedings, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 702 (1950). Regresssion analysis indicates
the proportion of the variance in a dependent variable that can be explained by (or is asso-
ciated with) the variance in one or more independent (exogenous) variables. This analysis
also provides estimates of the amount the dependent variable changes per unit change in
each of the independent variables.
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independent variables are often introduced. These variables mea-
sure things such as whether the product is a producer or a con-
sumer good, the degree of unionization, the degree of product
differentiation, the extent of the geographic market, the absolute
(or relative) size of the firm, and the degree of collusiveness.
On the surface, what information do these studies yield? First,
a vast majority of them show a positive association between profits,
rates of return, price-cost margins, or prices-as the dependent
variables-and market concentration-as the independent variable.
This association is not a linear one and it may not exist in isolation
from other structural factors. In Bain's original 1951 research, the
results suggested that profits were significantly higher only when
high concentration was combined with high barriers to entry; this
generalization still appears to hit close to the mark.'
4
The search for a unique, critical concentration ratio has been
unavailing. Up to some point, increases in concentration appear to
have no significant relationship with prices or profit rates, but that
point has not been demonstrated to be unique. It varies widely
from study to study, not independently of the sample of industries
and other variables used in the regressions.' 5 Moreover, the statis-
tical relationships found between concentration and profitability
are sensitive to the particular concentration measures used in the
analysis, despite the fact that, in general, the several measures of
concentration are themselves highly correlated. 16
Curiously, in some recent highly disaggregated studies, the ef-
fect of concentration on profitability has disappeared when the
market share of the individual firms was included as an explanatory
variable.1 7 In fact, the concentration effect sometimes appears as
negative in these studies. This result casts considerable doubt on
the idea that high concentration leads to higher profitability be-
cause of its facilitating collusion: If higher profits run with higher
shares for individual firms, not with higher combined shares, the
collusion hypothesis becomes suspect.
There are many other reasons to question any of the results of
these OLS regression analyses. One important reason is that re-
corded accounting rates of return may be grossly imperfect meas-
ures of economic profitability.' 8 Moreover, even if profitability
14 Neither is it at variance with the views ofJudge Hand in Alcoa, where he emphasized
entry barriers as well as a high market share.
15 See Geithman, Marvel & Weiss, supra note 12; White, supra note 12.
16 See Kwoka, Does the Choice of Concentration Measure Really Matter?, 29 J. INDUS. ECON.
445 (1981).
17 See Ravenscraft, supra note 12; Schmalensee, supra note 12.
18 See Fisher & McGowan, On the Misuse of Accounting Rates of Return to Infer Monopoly
Profits, 73 AMER. ECON. REV. 82 (1983). The Fisher-McGowan attack elicited strong reac-
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were correctly measured, it does not necessarily follow that monop-
oly power is exercised in ways that are fully reflected in profits.
Firms may have short-run objectives other than profit
maximization.
Another important criticism of the studies is that no satisfac-
tory statistical technique exists to define product and geographic
markets properly prior to computing concentration ratios for
classes of industries. For the most part, the studies use four digit
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes for product defini-
tions and then adopt national aggregates as the implicit geographic
demarcation.1 9 For anyone steeped in the antitrust approach to
market definition, this aspect of the studies by itself raises grave
questions on the meaningfulness of their results.
There is an important problem associated with statistical ob-
servations that are in the form of weighted averages. 20 When, for
example, the capital-output and the advertising-sales ratios for an
industry are measured as total industry capital divided by industry
output and total industry advertising divided by industry output,
respectively, the result is identical to the average of the same ratios
for individual firms, each weighted by that firm's share of industry
output. The ratios for the largest firms thus dominate the observa-
tions. A (relatively) very large firm may have heavy total advertising
and nonetheless have a (relatively) low advertising-sales ratio. In
such cases, the weighted industry average would be low, even
though smaller and entering firms might have to engage in heavy
advertising (relative to their sales) in order to compete.
It turns out, then, that thiese variables may not measure what
they are supposed to measure-in this case, the height of entry bar-
riers. 21 Actually, a majority of the studies to date are based on data
that are almost entirely formulated on some kind of weighted aver-
age. This is true for the industry profitability dependent variable,
tions, of course. See Horovitz, Long, Ravenscraft, Martin & van Breda, Comments, and
Fisher's reply, in 74 AMER. ECON. REV. 492-517 (1984).
19 Some of the earlier studies use two and three digit SIC groupings. The FTC "line of
business" statistics have been used in a number of recent works, with individual firm and
product line information incorporated. See, e.g., Ravenscraft, supra note 12. Occasionally,
researchers have moved between three and four digit SICs and higher level product classifi-
cations for particular industries to "correct" for apparent "outliers" in the structure-per-
formance relationship. A few studies introduce variables to reflect whether-
judgmentally-the real markets are predominantly international, national, regional, or
local.
20 On this, as well as on the next few points, see the methodological criticisms in Phil-
lips, A Critique of Empirical Studies of Relations Between Market Structure and Profitability, 24 J.
INDUS. ECON. 241 (1976) and Phillips, Evidence on Concentration in Banking Markets and Interest
Rates, 56 FED. RESERVE BULL. 916 (1967).
21 For greater detail, see K. COWLING,J. CABLE, M. KELLY & T. McGUINNESS, ADVERTIS-
ING AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR ch. 7 (1975) ("Advertising and Price-Cost Margins").
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for the concentration ratios, and for the entry barrier and demand
variables. Because of this, spurious and misleading results may
emerge.22
Finally, it must be emphasized that independent structural vari-
ables typically succeed in explaining a relatively small portion of the
total variance.2 3 This does not present a technical econometric
problem if, as is assumed, the omitted explanatory variables have
only random effects on the dependent variable. But if an omitted
variable were to be non-random and/or correlated with one or
more of the included dependent variables, totally incorrect results
may be read from the relationship shown in the regression
equations.
Again, an example may help. Suppose that the surviving firms
in an industry in which risk is high tend, on average, to be more
profitable than those in industries with lower risk. Suppose further
that, due to the fact that high risk knocks many firms out, concen-
tration in the more risky industries tends to be higher than in the
less risky. Now run a regression of profitability analysis on concen-
tration, omitting a measure of risk. The results will show that high
concentration "causes" (sic!) high profits, when in fact, it is the risk
differential that is running the show! The risk factor drives the in-
dustry structure; if risk-adjusted rates of return were considered,
profits might actually be lower-not higher-in the more concen-
trated group.2 4
There are innumerable analogous conjectures that might plau-
sibly cause misreadings of results, and some of these are not purely
hypothetical. When bank size and loan size were introduced into
regressions to measure relations between bank market concentra-
tion and loan interest rates, very different results emerged from
those when bank and loan size were ignored.25 It developed that
interest rates varied inversely with loan size, loan size varied di-
rectly with bank size, and-more surprisingly-metropolitan area
bank concentration varied inversely with bank size. The "naked"
relation between concentration and interest rates was in large mea-
22 That the results may then be more correct representations of the largest firms has
been in part responsible for the criticisms covered in Part III. This also helps explain why
the effects of industry concentration ratios tend to disappear when data on the market
shares of individual firms are put into the regressions.
23 That is, the (corrected) coefficient of multiple regression-the so-called R2 factor-
runs from, say, .20 to .40. Some are lower; some, higher. This leaves 60 to 80% of the
variance "unexplained."
24 An early classic dealing with risk and rates of return is G. STIGLER, CAPITAL AND
RATES OF RETURN IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES (1963). See also Cootner & Holland, Rate
of Return and Business Risk, 1 BELLJ. ECON. & MGT. Sci. 211 (1970); Fisher & Hall, Risk and
Corporate Rates of Return, 83 0. J. ECON. 79 (1969).
25 Phillips, Evidence on Concentration in Banking Markets and Interest Rates, supra note 20.
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sure masking an innocuous loan-size effect. Quite clearly, lawyers,
judges, and economists need to exercise care when relying on any
or all of these empirical works.
II. Market Structure and Stochastic Processes
Most students of industrial organization view market structure
as somehow related to market performance and firm conduct. Fur-
ther, in their quest for fuller understanding, they look for cause and
effect relationships including perhaps strategic conduct by firms
that affect market structure (e.g., monopolization) and non-strategic
performance flowing from market structure (e.g., monopoly pric-
ing). There is a view that all of this is wrong. Market structure and,
particularly, the appearance of concentrated markets have occa-
sionally been seen as nothing more than the results of random
events. If larger firms in concentrated markets have higher profits,
it is just a metaphoric "flip of the coin" that is involved.
Early variants of studies bearing on the possibility that stochas-
tic factors determine structure demonstrated how concentrated
populations of firms could easily emerge even when researchers
make no explicit assumptions about the conduct or, indeed, about
the superiority of any particular firm. 26 Subsequent models-
mostly non-empirical-incorporated temporal interdependencies,
with profits in one period affecting subsequent investment pos-
sibilities and the probability of future period profits. 27 Still more
recent work involves detailed computer simulations that permit the
analysis of various factors that increase or decrease the tendencies
for markets to become concentrated. 28 All of these studies illus-
trate once again that the identification of concentration with mo-
nopoly power is indeed a fragile "mental construct."
III. Market Concentration and "Superior Skill,
Foresight and Industry"
In Alcoa, Judge Hand seemingly dismissed the idea that Alcoa's
market power arose from "superior skill, foresight and industry."
Today, it is less easy to dismiss criticisms of econometric tests of
the S-C-P paradigm that rest on essentially the same arguments.
The generally positive relationship that researchers have found be-
26 Hart & Prais, The Analysis of Business Concentration, 119 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC'Y 150
(1956); Ijiri & Simon, Business Firm Growth and Size, 54 AMER. ECON. REV. 77 (1964); Simon &
Bonini, The Size Distribution of Business Firms, 48 AMER. ECON. REV. 607 (1958).
27 See, e.g., Mancke, Causes of Interfirm Profitability Difference: A New Interpretation of the Evi-
dence, 88 Q.J. EcON. 181 (1974).
28 In particular, see R. NELSON & S. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC
CHANGE (1982); Nelson & Winter, Forces Generating and Limiting Concentration Under
Schumpeterian Competition, 9 BELLJ. ECON. & MGT. ScI. 524 (1978).
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tween concentration and profitability could be due to a system of
causation quite different from the relationship assigned by that par-
adigm. The "superior skill, foresight and industry" of a few firms
could be reflected in their having lower costs, better products, and,
consequently, higher profits and larger market shares. WhatJudge
Hand apparently saw as the exceptional case might indeed be the
rule.
The truth is that nearly all of the empirical studies surveyed are
not specified in a way that discriminates among competing hypothe-
ses regarding the reasons why concentration and profitability may
be positively interrelated. This was noted by economists of the
"Chicago School" (among others) shortly after the first round of
large scale, computer-based studies appeared. 29 Those defending
the S-C-P paradigm (and the econometric studies they felt sup-
ported that approach) were quick to dismiss the merits of the at-
tack. 30 This hardly quelled the dissent,3' and it may well be that
there is currently declining sympathy for the S-C-P approach-re-
gardless of the results of the econometrics. 32
There are two trains of thought about "superior skill, foresight
and industry." With perhaps some exaggeration, the first is that of
the "Chicago School." This position holds that the S-C-P approach
is entirely wrong. Causation runs from superior performance to
high concentration, this school argues, except where governments
provide protection. Thus it dismisses any possibility that high con-
centration may be associated with socially harmful market power. A
few have attempted to supply empirical support for this position,
but their efforts have yielded very mixed results. 33 Scherer has sug-
29 See, e.g., Brozen, The Significance of Profit Data for Antitrust Policy, 14 ANTITRUST BULL.
119 (1969); Brozen, Bain's Concentration and Rates of Return Revisited, 14J. L. & ECON. 351
(1971); Brozen, Concentration and Profits: Does Concentration Matter?, 19 ANTITRUST BULL. 381
(1974).
30 See the comments by Wenders, MacAvoy, McKie, and Preston, along with further
comments by Brozen, in 14 J. L. & ECON. 485-512 (1971).
31 Shortly after the exchange noted in notes 29-30 supra came what is perhaps the most
notable of these dissents. See Demsetz, Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Polity, 16
J. L. & ECON. 1 (1973). See also Demsetz, Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly, in INDUSTRIAL
CONCENTRATION, supra note 12; Peltzman, The Gains and Losses from Industrial Concentration, 20
J. L. & ECON. 229 (1977).
32 In this context, the "Chicago School" view is somewhat similar to late nineteenth
century "Social Darwinism." That is, "stronger" (better) firms weed out the "weaker"
(poorer) firms, and increases in concentration reflect only the "survival of the fittest" (best)
firms. There is also a flavor of the early Schumpeter school of thought. In THE THEORY OF
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1911), Schumpeter depicted the rise of monopoly markets as a
consequence of successful innovation. Thus market structure was, as in the "Chicago
School" view, an endogenous part of a market system, with structural change dependent on
differential performance by firms in the market.
33 In addition to the articles by Brozen, supra note 29, and Peltzman, supra note 31, see
Carter, Collusion, Efficiency and Antitrust, 21 J. INDUS. ECON. 435 (1978) and Brown, The Rela-
tionship Between Concentration and Profitability in the Banking Industry, Working Paper No. 94,
1106 [Vol. 61:1 .099
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gested that the "fundamental disagreement" based on differences
in "schools" is so pronounced that it "is doubtful that they would
vanish even if statistics on performance and quality were available
in unlimited quantity and impeccable quality." 34
The other attack on the causation theme in the orthodox S-C-P
approach is more moderate. It in fact incorporates both the S-C-P
and the "Chicago School" views into one, more general conception
of the market process. While this synthesis acknowledges that con-
centration may indeed confer market power, it also recognizes that
concentration may arise because of superior performance.35 Again,
attempts at empirical verification of the existence of such a two-way
relationship are limited.36
On methodological grounds alone, it is clear that essentially no
confidence can be placed in any of the OLS regression studies done
in this area. This is true whether the hypotheses being tested are
those of the S-C-P paradigm or those of the "Chicago School."
And it would remain true even if the econometric difficulties (dis-
cussed in Part I) somehow disappeared. Ironically, this truth is not
because both the S-C-P and "Chicago" approaches are wrong;
rather it is the consequence of each of them being true-or, more
correctly, half true!
IV. Conclusion
While the econometric studies offer scant guidance for those
prosecuting or defending a market structure case or for those at-
tempting to define public policy, they do provide some important
lessons. The first and most obvious one is that lawyers, judges, and
economists should accord the studies no more importance than
Center for the Study of American Business, Washington University (St. Louis, October
1985). Both of the latter purport findings congruent with Demsetz's thesis. See note 31
supra. Scherer attacked Peltzman's methods and results. Scherer, The Causes and Conse-
quences of Rising Industrial Concentration, 22 J. INDUS. ECON. 229 (1979). Others investigated
the Demsetz thesis for British firms but found essentially no support for it. Clarke, Davies
& Waterson, The Profitability-Concentration Relation: Market Power or Efficiency, 32 J. INDUS.
ECON. 435 (1984).
34 F. SCHERER, supra note 6, at 290.
35 For detail and background, see Phillips, Structure, Conduct and Performance-And Per-
formance, Conduct and Structure?, in INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF EDWARD S. MASON (J. Markham & G. Papanek eds. 1970); Phillips,
Commentary, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION, supra note 12.
36 But see Phillips, An Econometric Study of Price-Fixing, Market Structure and Performance in
British Industry in the Early 1950s, in MARKET STRUCTURE AND CORPORATE BEHAVIOUR: THE-
ORY AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FIRM (K. Cowling ed. 1972); Strickland & Weiss, Adver-
tising, Concentration, and Price-Cost Margins, 84 J. POL. ECON. 1109 (1976); Gabel, A
Simultaneous Equation Analysis of the Structure and Performance of the United States Petroleum Refin-
ing Industry, 28J. INDUS. ECON. 89 (1979); M. INTRILIGATOR, ECONOMETRIC MODELS, TECH-
NIQUES AND APPLICATIONS 475-80 (1978).
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they deserve. On a scale of one to ten, the studies merit only "two-
and-a-half cheers."
A second message that comes through "loud and clear" is that
the relationship between market structure variables and monopoly
power is a complicated one. This has been recognized by most
practitioners, even if it has escaped economic theorists and
econometricians. Nevertheless, one occasionally finds unjustified
efforts to generalize and simplify in contexts in which those efforts
are inappropriate.3 7 In any event, cases have to be considered on
their merits.
The third point follows immediately from the second. Where
high market concentration is found and, especially, where the facts
show changing shares and rising concentration, the possibility that
the market is moving toward a more efficient organizational struc-
ture must be explored. That offenses of monopolization may occur
can hardly be denied, but the "Chicago School" view is not com-
pletely wrong. Neither is it exclusively correct.
37 Note that even Judge Hand generalized in terms of 90%, 60 or 64%, and 33%.
This, however, was more excusable in Alcoa than the Supreme Court's use of marke slhare
in cases such as United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966), and United Slates
v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
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